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Court reform:
a view from the bottom
Local limited jurisdictioncourts, "the lowest of the lower courts,"
have long been the focus of criticism. Reformers, however, must
carefully identify and address these courts'particular
problems
and needs, because the standardcourt reform model may not apply.
JOE VAN SEVEREN

~has

by Julia Lamber and Mary Lee Luskin
been written about

M

lower court reform.' Aluch,
perhaps
much,
though
most too
of the
literature is prescriptive, scholars also
have looked at the origins and history
of court reform, identifying three periods of activism in this century. 2 The
first, beginning in 1906 with Pound's
catalyzing address to the American Bar
Association, saw the formulation of
the central tenets of mainstream reform in calls for simplifying court
structure, centralizing accountability
Prepared under a grant from the Indiana Supreme Court. Points of view or opinions in this
article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Indiana Supreme
Court.
1. Task Force on the Administration of Justice,
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1976); The American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Jtdicial Administration, STANDARDS REI.ATING TO COURT
ORGANIZATION (1974); Silberman, NON-ATORNEY
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
(1979); Wheeler and Whitcomb,JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1977).

2. Munger, Movements for Court Reform: A Prelimi-

nary Interpretation,in Dubois (ed.), THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL REFORM 51 (1982). See also Glick, The Poli-

tics of State Court Reform, in Dubois, id. at 17;
Provine, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NON-LAWw:R JUDGES
AND THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM (1986);
Berkson, A Brief History of Court Reform, in Berkson,
Hays, and Carbon (eds.), MANAGING "THE STATE
COURTS (1977); Baar, The Scope and Limits of Court

within the judiciary, and increasing
the professional qualifications of court
personnel. Under the banner of court
unification, these proposals became
the manifesto of mainstream reform.
A second wave of activism, in the
late 1930s and 1940s, saw the first
adoptions of these prescriptions. And
a third wave, peaking in the 1960s and
1970s, brought widespread adoption.
By the mid-1980s, Henderson and his
colleagues4 could write that the question was not whether a state court system was unified but the extent of unifiReform, 5 JUST. Ss. J. 274 (1980); Baar, Inter-court
Relations in ComparativePerspective: Toward an Ecology of Trial Courts, 12 JUST. Sys. J. 19 (1987);
Harrington, Delegalization Reform Movements: A Historical Analysis, in Abel (ed.), THE PoLITICs OF INFORMALJUSTICE, VoL. 2 (1982).

3. On the elements of mainstream reform, see
Baar, Inter-Court Relations, supra n. 2, at 274-275;
Glick, supra n. 2, at 18-19.
4. Henderson, Kerwin, Guynes, Baar, Miller,
Saizow, and Greiser, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDICIAL
STRUCTURE: THE EFFECT OF UNIFICATION ON TRIAL
COURT OPERATIONS 8 (1984).

5. Baar, Inter-Court Relations, supra n. 2, at 24.
6. Baar, The Scope and Limits of Court Reform,
supra n. 2, at 283-285; Gallas, The Conventional Wisdom of State Court Administration: A Critical Assessment and an Alternative Approach, 2 Jus. Ss. J. 35
(1976).
7. Baar, Inter-Court Relations, supra n. 2, at 23,
suggests that reform does not reach these lower
courts because they are limited jurisdiction courts
in which judges need not be lawyers.
8. Provine, supra n. 2.

cation. And Baar concluded that unification has been accomplished and is
unlikely to proceed further.' In this
period, courts also became increasingly professionalized.
Yet we should not too quickly conclude that court reform is complete.
First, the challenges to the underlying
principles of mainstream reform remain.' Second, many "unreformed"
courts continue to exist, especially
among the lowest of the lower
courts-that is, local limited jurisdiction courts in which judges need not
be lawyers. Here, and among limited
jurisdiction courts more generally, reform has been less thorough than
among major trial courts. Baar argues
that reformers were less successful
with limited jurisdiction courts because the nature of their work made it
difficult to integrate them into a unified court structure.7 But the failure to
"reform" these courts has not meant
satisfaction with them, nor has it provided a redefinition of the ideal. Instead, overlapping jurisdictions, local
accountability, and nonlawyer judges
keep these courts vulnerable to the
standard reform critique.8
Opposing these pressures is the re295

surgent political strength of concepts
court reform in the 1970s, these courts
of community, access, and local auwere twice scheduled for abolition. Betonomy, manifested in the growth of
fore their elimination, however, the
alternative dispute resolution and
legislature enacted the current legislation allowing cities and towns courts if
community policing. These forces may
help insulate local limited jurisdiction
they wanted them.
courts or even lead to their expansion.
The critique
Witness the proposal to use New York's
town and village courts as a model for
To the extent these courts remain
"unreformed," they continue to renew community-based courts in Manhattan, for example.' How the mainsemble justice of the peace courts bestream reform critique will affect the
cause they are part-time institutions
implementation of such proposals is
with nonlawyer judges and very limunclear, but to the degree that new inited subject matter. And because they
look like justice of the peace courts,
stitutions resemble their prototypes,
they will be subject to the standard cricriticisms of the latter stick to them.
Thus the conventional view would sugtique and prescriptions. Thus we
should expect conflict over structure,
gest that Indiana city and town courts
the judges' views seriously, we depart exist because they are moneymakers
jurisdiction, and staffing.
Whether local limited jurisdiction from much of the prescriptive litera- for their communities or cheap
courts are reformed, remain as de- ture, which sees the judges as venal sources of patronage. For example,
spised anomalies, or expand, it is im- and ignorant at worst and well mean- one reformer concludes a justice of
the peace is "prone to regard his ofportant to understand mainstream ing but incompetent at best."
reform's implications for them. This
Indiana cities and towns have au- fice as a business operation rather
article looks at the likely impact of thority to create or abolish these than a vehicle for the administration
standard reform prescriptions for the courts independently. In 1988, 73 of justice."'" The critique continues
local limited jurisdiction courts of one communities opted for such courts, that, because their judges need not be
state, Indiana. We argue that most pre- but the majority of Indiana's cities and legally trained, they are dependent on
scriptions are merely symbolic: to the towns did not. Judges for these courts police and prosecutors. Moreover, the
extent that the problems reformers need not be lawyers and, in 1988, judges are said to be especially suscepidentify are real, mainstream reform more than half were not. These courts, tible to local economic, social, and poproposals are unlikely to address like similar ones in other states, have litical pressures and to personal prejthem. Instead, reform proposals ad- jurisdiction over all violations of city udice, resulting in questionable
dress non-issues, advocating what are and town ordinances as well as over all decision making. Judges of these
already structural and jurisdictional misdemeanors and infractions.ia City, courts, for example, are described as
realities."l In other instances, they may but not town, courts also have jurisdic- administering "unequal justice withdo more harm than good. For sugges- tion in civil cases where the contested out regard to law."' 6
tions for improving these courts, we amount does not exceed, in most
Though consistently drawn, this piclistened instead to the judges serving courts, $500."4 Fines for violations of ture is not based on much direct eviin local limited jurisdiction courts, infractions and misdemeanors go to dence. 7 Our empirical study did not set
and we propose some measures based the state. Court costs, set by state stat- out to examine the effects of reform proute, are apportioned among the state, posals, yet we were struck by the enduron their views.
county, and local governmental unit, ing quality of these courts in the face of
Empirical study
with the largest share going to the near universal contempt by professionIn recently completed cross-sectional state. As part of Indiana's general als. Moreover, our evidence on the acresearch, we studied the work, finances, and personnel of Indiana's
1977, P.L. 313, sec. 1. Probably the most common
9. N. Y. TIMEs, September 27, 1990, at B1.
See also Kress and Stanley, JusTicE COURTS IN
infraction handled by these city and town courts is
city and town courts. In the fall of THE.10.STATE
OF Ntw YORK 12 (1976).
speeding.
11. Laimber & Luskin, City and Town Court: Map1988, we mailed questionnaires to all
14. The subject matter is also limited so that the
Their Dimensions, 67 IND. L.J. 59 (1991).
ordinary city court does not have jurisdiction in
city and town court judges, inter- ping
actions for slander, libel, mortgage foreclosures,
12. For a discussion of the empirical base of this
viewed a subset of them, and collected critique, see Provine, supra n. 2, at 45.
probate matters, guardians, or actions in equity.
13. IC 33-10.1-2-2 (city coturt); 33-10.1-2-7 (town
IC 33-10.1-2-3.1.
statistical information from a variety of courts).
The city courts in the three second class cities in
Infractions are violations of a statute for
sources on caseloads, court revenues which a person might be fined but not impris- Lake County havejurisdiction in civil cases where
IC 33-1-13-1 (1988). In 1981 the state legisthe amount in controversy does not exceed $2500.
and expenses, and city and town fi- oned.
IC 33-10.1-2-4. City courts in third class cities that
lature added many infractions by decriminalizing
nances. Elsewhere we report on the many traffic offenses, designating several other are not the county seat have civil jurisdiction
where the amount in controversy does not exceed
as infractions, and lowering the status of
personnel, caseloads, and finances of actions
some existing non-traffic offenses. Acts of 1981, P.
$1000. IC 33-10.1-2-5.
15. Vanlandingham, The Decline of the Justice of
these courts.' Here we consider the L. 108. Maximum fines for infractions are found
in IC 43-4-32-4. Indiana created this new category
the Peace, 12 U. KAN. L. REV. 389, 391 (1964).
judges' responses to questions about of
petty violations in 1977 when it substantially re16. Id.
training and other support. In taking vised and modernized its criminal code. Acts of
17. Supra n. 11.

Existing evidence
does not show that
lawyers and
nonlawyers differ
in how they judge.
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tual work of these courts suggests why
reforms have been so unsuccessful.

Remedies
The most sweeping change, which has
been noticeably unsuccessful, would
be to eliminate these courts or, short
of that, to require their judges to be
lawyers. 18 The casual observer might
argue that the latter remedy would
mean the courts' abolition. According
to this view, it is unlikely that enough
lawyers would be willing to serve. The
data, however, do not support this notion. Alternatively, one might argue
that requiring the judges to be lawyers
would so alter the courts' character
that they would be no different from
other courts of limited jurisdiction.
Our guess is that the courts' character
involves more than just the judges'
educational level.
Another sweeping reform would
make these courts full time. Such a
change would address the criticisms
that the courts are not professional
and that the judges inevitably have
conflicts of interest because their main
attention is focused elsewhere. Such a
change also could alter the character
of these courts as informal, alternative
dispute forums. Because of the increased costs necessary to support a
full-time court, the most likely consequence of this remedy would be to
eliminate them. Even if the reform is
simply to make the judge full time, the
change probably would alter the character of the courts.
A goal of the judicial reforms of the
1970s, including the creation of Indiana's county court system, was to create full-time institutions and eliminate
part-time ones, yet Indiana's city and
town courts persist. In another article
we consider the ability of these courts
to withstand pressure to abolish
18. See, e.g., Task Force on the Administration
ofJustice, supra n. 1, at 35.
19. Lamber and Luskin, supra n. 11, at 79-83.
20. Silberman, supra n. 1, at 104.
21. In Indiana a second-class city has a population range of 35,000 to 249,999. In our sample,
there are five second class cities, and all have lawyer judges.
22. See Provine, supra n. 2. Silberman, supra n. 1,
has an extensive and useful bibliography. See also,
Kress and Stanley, supra n. 10; Ryan & Guterman,
Lawyer v. Non-Lawyer Town justices, 60 JUOICArURE
274 (1977).
23. See particularly Provine, supra n. 2, at 122165.
24. Silberman, supra n. 1, at 105.

them. 9 Here we discuss more limited
proposals designed to address specific
problems. These questions are related,
because how one feels about abolishing the courts, restricting them to lawyer judges, or making them full time
depends on understanding the issues
raised below.
Several reforms are pragmatic,
based on the notion that nonlawyer
judges are a necessary evil to be tolerated but not encouraged. For example, Professor Linda Silberman suggests that lay judges' jurisdiction
should be restricted by population, fiscal base, and attorney availability.20 We
heard a similar suggestion in our interviews, in this case, that second-class cities2 ' be required to have lawyer judges
or that all cities with populations over
20,000 have lawyer judges. Our data
show these suggestions already mirror
reality, even though no such limitations on nonlawyer judges exist in Indiana. All communities with a population of more than 20,000 have lawyer
judges. Indeed, the largest Indiana
community to have a nonlawyer judge
has a population of 15,000, while the
smallest to have a lawyer judge has a
population of 2,200.
More important, this reform does
little to address the critique of these
courts; it simply assumes that lawyers
would do a better job. Existing evidence
does not show that lawyers and non22
lawyers differ in how they judge.
Rather, the difference seems to be between courts with and without resources. 23 To the extent that court resources are related to community size,
courts in smaller, rather than larger,
communities need attention. A reform
that creates two classes of courts based
on community size is likely to compound
the resource problem. The same objections hold for reforms that restrict
25. Id. at 105-110.
26. Id. at 111.

27.

INDIANAJUDICIA REPORT, Vol I, 1988 at 53.
28. IC 33-10.1-5-9.
29. The Indiana City and Town Court statute
appears to allow for an automatic change of
judge, IC 33-10.1-5-2, as does a general criminal
statute, IC 35-36-5-1. Rule 12, Indiana Rules of
Criminal Procedure, however, makes the change
of judge discretionary. State ex rel. Robinson v.
Grant Superior Court No. 1, 471 N.E.2d 302, 303
(Ind. 1984) (statute has no force and effect to the
extent it conflicts with Indiana Rule of Criminal
Procedure). Accord, Gary v. State, 471 N. E. 2d
695, 698 (Ind. 1984).

nonlawyer judges to communities with
smaller fiscal bases or without lawyers.
Two other pragmatic reforms are
concerned with criminal defendants'
rights. One suggestion is that courts in
which judges need not be lawyers have
an extremely limited criminal jurisdiction so that a criminal defendant's legal rights are within the control of a
lawyer judge whenever possible. 4 This
limitation, the argument goes, should
be measured in terms of both complexity and punishment. Thus jury trials could not take place in city and
town courts because they are too complicated for lay people to conduct.
Most reformers would agree that ordinance and traffic violations would be
within the range of cases these courts
could hear. Silberman concludes that,
on balance, these courts also could
hear uncontested misdemeanors. But
she argues that restrictions on jurisdiction should be based on possible punishments sought in a particular case
2
rather than the offense category. 1
The other pragmatic reform addressed to criminal defendants pro26
vides for transfer to a lawyer judge.
Silberman suggests that automatic
transfer to a lawyer judge is preferred,
but providing for automatic transfer
for offenses with prison terms or requiring trial de novo on appeal would
be sufficient to meet the problem.
Current practice in Indiana already
conforms to these limitations. Jury trials in Indiana city and town courts are
rare: in 1988 there were seven.27 The
reported caseload is overwhelmingly
ordinance and traffic violations, and
uncontested misdemeanors. Furthermore, Indiana provides for a trial de
novo on appeal from city and town
courts. 2 8 Indiana also allows automatic
changes in judge, by right in civil cases
29
and by discretion in criminal cases.
These reforms are simply exceptions to the view that all judges should
be lawyers. They presuppose that
nonlawyer judges are not as good at
protecting the rights of criminal defendants and that the solution is to allow the criminal defendant a trial by a
lawyer judge or at least to make sure
that nonlawyer judges do not decide
anything important. But to the extent
that nonlawyers and lawyers do not differ in how they judge, these exceptions

f

are unnecessary.
One can make similar reform arguments for civil cases. Courts in which
judges need not be lawyers should
have only concurrent civil jurisdiction,
limited to "simple civil matters," with
automatic transfer to a lawyer judge
and no jury trials. Again, the data conform to this limitation. The statute
limits city court civil jurisdiction to
$500 in most cases, 0 although ordinance violations are within the exclusive jurisdiction of city and town
courts. Indiana's "by right" change of
judge rule applies to civil cases, and
jury trials are very rare. But again,
there is no justification-empirical or
theoretical-for this proposal; it simply assumes that a lawyer judge would
be better.'"

Training programs
A different kind of reform calls for
mandatory training programs for
nonlawyer judges of limited jurisdiction courts. Silberman reasons that
whether training is considered valuable depends on one's view about how
much education is needed. For those
who think that because of their comprehensive law school education, all
judges should be lawyers, no training
program could, or should, replace
that experience. Similarly, for those
who think that common sense is all
that is needed to preside over a court
of limited jurisdiction, training is unnecessary, because anyone of reasonable intelligence can serve effectively.
Silberman argues for a middle position: Because courts of limited jurisdiction require fewer demanding legal
judgments than general jurisdiction
courts, a well-designed training program is the best way to reduce incompetent decision making without elimi33
nating the position altogether.
Any training program would have to
take into account wide differences
among the courts in workloads, resources, and environment. Yearly filings
in Indiana's city and town courts ranged
from less than 100 to more than 15,000.
Notwithstanding similar jurisdictions,
the kinds of cases the courts heard differed considerably. Among city courts,
which have civil jurisdiction while town
courts do not, most heard few or no civil
cases. But the range was enormous, with
298
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A well-designed
training program
is the best way to
reduce incompetent
decision making.

one court's docket composed almost entirely of civil cases. Criminal caseloads
varied as well. Some courts heard mostly
minor traffic violations, while others
heard mostly non-traffic misdemeanors.
A further question involves the content of a training program. The assumption is that what is needed has
something to do with training in the
law, because lawyer judges are exempt.
But is training in the law the most essential component? Most decisions
city and town court judges make are
not legally complex. But managing
large caseloads, mediating interpersonal disputes, brokering community
services, and marshaling the cooperation of county-level agencies are difficult, especially with limited budgets
and nonexistent staffs. Any "well-designed training program" should pay
attention to the courts' actual work.
Finally, training does little to address
the conventional critique that these
courts are interested only in making
money, providing patronage, and ignoring civil disputes. Nor does the reform address the criticism-founded
or not-that the judges are too susceptible to local economic, social, and po30. See IC 33-10.1-2-3.1-33-10.1-2-5.
31. It is ironic that these courts are criticized on
the one hand as inadequate to decide civil cases
and on the other as inadequate for failing to hear
civil cases. It may be that the criticism for failure
to do civil work is based on the notion that a court
has to hear all kinds of cases to be a "real" court.
32. Silberman, supra n. 1, at 117; Kress and
Stanley, supra n. 10, at 159.
A different but similar reform calls for a system
of judicial counsellors; see Kress and Stanley,
supra n. 10, at 159-160; along with their suggestion
that the state assign responsibility for supervision
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litical pressure.
Another reform proposes the enactment of a code of conduct for nonlawyer judges. 4 This reform has the
potential to speak directly to some
parts of the popular critique of limited
jurisdiction courts in which judges
need not be lawyers. For example, to
the extent that the city and town
judges are criticized for relying too
much on police and prosecutor, or being too susceptible to local pressures, a
code of conduct and training in its application may be worthwhile. Also beneficial is the practice of the Indiana
Commission on Judicial Qualifications
of providing written opinions to help
resolve questions about permissible
conduct. In addition to the formal
opinions, the commission responds in
writing to judges whose concerns are
primarily local in nature.15 But neither
a code nor the opinions can address
other parts of the critique, such as the
appearance of making too much
money. The basic problem with the
code of conduct reform is the difficulty of writing such a code with
enough specificity and flexibility.

The judges' views
How do the judges see their own
needs? In contrast with other studies
that rely on information from central
state sources, we sought the judges'
views of their own educational needs.
We asked judges whether they felt
their training was adequate to perform certain judicial functions, what
kinds of help they would find useful,
and what they find most difficult about
the job. Not surprisingly, the judges
believe they are adequately trained to
decide the cases that come before
them and to impose sentences. Eightyeight percent said their training is adequate to decide criminal cases, 86
percent said it is adequate to decide
civil cases, and 97 percent said their
and oversight of these courts to county court
judges; id. at 153-155. Without this supervisory responsibility, which in itself is quite a drastic
change, it is unclear how this system of counsellors would work.
33. Silberman, supra n. 1, at 248-49.
34. Kress and Stanley, supra n. 10, at 153. In Indiana the state Supreme Court would enact such a
code because the Indiana Constitution grants it
exclusive and original jurisdiction in matters involving the discipline, removal, and retirement of
judges in Indiana. Ind. Const. Art. 7. sec. 4.
35. INDIANAJUDICIAL RE'ORTS, 1988, Vol.1 at 1-2.

Table 1 Judges' interest in help

Help with

Very
interested

Somewhat
interested

Not at all
interested

Civil cases
Case management
Record keeping
Personnel
Sentencing, alcohol related
Sentencing, other
Defendants' rights
Judicial ethics

48%
56
60
37
77
77
84
80

24%
40
38
51
14
17
15
18

28%
4
2
12
10
6
2
2

training is adequate to impose sen- aspect of administration and 25 pertences. Although both lawyers and cent mentioned the difficulty of imnonlawyers are confident, lawyers are posing punishment. We characterized
more confident. All the lawyers be- another 36 percent of the difficulties
lieved they have the training to per- reported as being "other work specific"-that is, they involved performform all of these tasks.
Nonetheless, the judges would wel- ing the duties of judge. Although
come help. We asked whether they these responses varied, a typical rewould be "very interested," "some- sponse concerned the difficulty of
what interested," or "not at all inter- learning to be fair. Such responses are
ested" in various sorts of help. Table 1 consistent with the judges' expression
summarizes their responses. A major- of interest in help with respect to senity were at least somewhat interested in tencing and especially with respect to
each category of help. The judges defendants' rights and judicial ethics.
were least interested in help with civil
Because we did not analyze case outcases: 28 percent were not at all inter- comes, we cannot speak directly to the
ested (no doubt because so few of issue of impartiality in decision makthem hear civil cases). Yet even for this ing. Nonetheless, the interviews show
item, 48 percent said they were very in- judges who accept, in principle, a stanterested in help.
dard of impartiality. No doubt the
Three questionnaire items per- principle is easier to uphold than the
tained to administration: case manage- practice. Yet judges were sensitive to
ment, record keeping, and personnel. special problems created by their local
Again the judges are interested in ties to their communities. Some talked
help. Among these, they expressed the about impartiality as something one
least interest in help with personnel, has to learn; many reported that improbably because most courts employ partiality was the hardest part of doing
only one person (usually part time) their job. They reported feeling disbesides the judge. More than three- comfort the first few times they found
fourths of the judges expressed strong against friends or acquaintances. And
interest in help with sentencing in they pointed to previous experiboth alcohol-related and other cases. ences-for example, as a law enforceThey were most interested, however, ment officer-that prepared them to
in help with respect to defendants'
ignore personal feelings.
rights and judicial ethics, with 84 percent and 80 percent, respectively, say- A modest suggestion
ing they were very interested.
Mainstream reforms are largely symFinally, we asked judges, "What is bolic, based on the notion that only
the most difficult part of yourjob?" Of lawyers should be judges. To the exthe 53 judges who responded to the tent the conventional critique of limquestion, 28 percent mentioned some ited jurisdiction courts identifies problems, mainstream reform proposals
36. Baar, The Scope and Limits of Court, supra n. 2, are unlikely to address them. And even
at 286-288.
37. Some authors are especially suspicious of when reality conforms to suggested rethe exercise ofjudicial power in small places. See, forms, dissatisfaction remains with
e.g., Wood, SUBURBIA: ITS PEOPLE & THEIR POLITICS
limited jurisdiction courts in which
280 (1958). ("The smaller the town, the morejustice is a matter of personal opinion in the commu- judges need not be lawyers. Yet it is
nity itself, rarely formalized, rarely permanently
unlikely that these courts will disapestablished depending on the sentiment of the
moment.")
pear in the foreseeable future (nor is it

clear that we should break out the
Dom Peringnon if they should). As
long as we retain the standard court
reform model as the sole model for
the "improvement" of these courts,
however, we inhibit action that might
provide support to them or improve
the quality ofjustice they dispense. 6
Given what is known about these
courts and their judges, states should
focus their reform efforts and educational messages on addressing ethical
dilemmas in nonthreatening contexts.
If the presumption in favor of lawyer
judges is set aside, the core of the critique of local limited jurisdiction
courts is concern about the fairness of
decision making within a structure
embedded in local politics and society. 7 The interviews and survey suggest the judges know that impartiality
in their jobs is necessary but difficult
and that there is a real interest among
the judges in knowing more.
Recent scandals in government and
business have brought issues of ethics
to the fore. Also, there is more concern
with how individuals can be sensitized
to the presence of ethical issues as they
arise in their work. Doctors, lawyers,
journalists, and researchers have realized the need for training in ethics,
and ethicists are developing ways to
teach these issues. This training differs
from typical educational efforts, because the point is to practice recognizing ethical issues and to develop ways
of thinking about issues, facts, or
people, rather than to know how and
where to look something up in a book.
Not only does focusing on ethics education reach the heart of the critique of
these courts, it has the advantage of not
involving additional costs (or generating
more paperwork) for local courts. Efforts like those in Indiana to provide
written answers to local inquiries are also
good. States also might want to consider
adopting a separate code of conduct for
limitedjurisdiction courtjudges. But the
most important part of such a reform
would be training in its application or
more generally focused education on
those issues.
El
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